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The Conversion from Stalinism to 'Titoism': Its Im-
pact on the Yugoslav Communist Militants* 
by 
Sava D. Bosnitch 
In the Communist party, as in religion, if there is a difference 
of opinion between two men they sever all relationships. 
M. Djilas 
Stalin lost the battle not on the day he died but much earlier. 
Sometime in the autumn of 1949 I had firmly come to the con-
clusion: God has disappeared and I have no more gods. 
V. Dedijer 
Introduction 
The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute of 1948-1955 remains synonymous 
with the worst political and ideological crisis experienced by the Yu-
goslav Communists since their seizure of power. While the real causes 
of the conflicts may still be a matter of controversy or mystery, its 
outbreak, course and consequences are already in the realm of in-
controvertibly established historical record.1 It is well known that the 
Soviet and Cominform allegations undermined the ideological basis 
of "legitimacy" of the revolutionary regime in Yugoslavia. These charges 
impelled the Yugoslav Communist leadership into both improvising 
an ideological self-defense and reappraising all their policies. As a 
result, a wholesale reorientation of Yugoslavia's foreign policy and a 
redirection of domestic policies were witnessed. Such radical policy 
changes were, of necessity, accompanied and buttressed by appro-
priate political rationalizations and ideological justifications. Gradually 
and cumulatively these Marxist-Leninist 'apologetics' amounted to a 
comprehensive qualitative transformation of the official Yugoslav 
Communist ideology. Thus dynamic ideological changes spelled both 
an eclipse of Stalinism and the rise of what became known in the West 
as "Titoism" or "national Communism."2 
The ideological issues that were at stake in this unprecedented 
dispute were exhaustively explored and analyzed from a great variety 
of viewpoints in the East, West and also in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, 
this torrential academic, publicist and journalistic output notwith-
standing, little attention was paid to the traumatic impact that this 
ideological crisis had on the Yugoslav Communists. Accordingly, the 
purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by attempting to reconstruct 
the collective experience of the Yugoslav Communist believers caught 
in that ideological storm. 
*This is an abbreviated version of the paper presented at the Xllth World Congress 
of the International Political Science Association, Rio de Janeiro August 12, 1982. 
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Monitoring intimate, complex, divided or fluctuating loyalties is 
at any time a formidable task. In this particular case, any attempt was, 
until recently, absolutely impossible because of the protracted paucity 
and inaccessibility of any reliable or verifiable data. Namely, apart 
from the terse and laconic official Yugoslav statements and the rev-
elations volunteered by the Yugoslav Communist leaders, very little 
was known either of the spontaneous or forced conversions of most 
of the party cadres. Furthermore, for decades, almost nothing was 
publicly said about the treatment meted out to real or suspected Sta-
linists as the collective predicament of the 'Cominformists' was a taboo 
in Titoist Yugoslavia.3 
In view of the proliferation of crises of the established Communist 
ideologies in the contemporary polycentric Marxist-Leninist world, 
even this fragmentary account of the Yugoslav precedent might, at 
least partially, advance the understanding of the Titoist case and aid 
the comprehension of the impact that such generically similar crisis 
had on Albanian, Chinese and Cambodian Communist militants. 
Historical Setting 
To fathom the impact of the crisis, it is necessary to recall that 
in 1948 Yugoslav Communists were widely recognized for their Marx-
ist-Leninist orthodoxy and mimetic ideological rectitude typical of the 
monolithic Stalinist era. Yugoslav Communists were considered Sta-
lin's best disciples and Yugoslavia was viewed as the enthusiastic and 
militant "Satellite Number One of the Soviet Union."4 This voluntary 
self-identification with the USSR and Stalin was a natural by-product 
of the fact that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) had been 
during its entire prerevolutionary history, and especially so under 
Tito, emotionally, ideologically, organizationally and financially totally 
dependent on the Comintern, CPSU(b), USSR and Stalin. These So-
viet institutions and Stalin were the final arbiters in all CPY matters.5 
For a summary illustration of the Stalinist record of future Ti-
toists, a few samples of their ideologically induced mentality must 
suffice. As the "bolshevisation" of the "national" sections of the Com-
intern was measured by fidelity to the USSR, the CPY gradually de-
veloped an unquestioning allegiance to this alien authority.6 The 
resulting constant primacy of the "internationalist" obligations of the 
party was regularly coupled with a sacrifice of Yugoslav national in-
terests. In a land whose long history is identified with a passion for 
independence, this fact alone was sufficient to qualify the CPY as an 
alien movement. Even as internationally recognized rulers of a sov-
ereign state, the CPY leaders not only obeyed Soviet instructions, but 
also requested Soviet advice "which would direct the internal and 
foreign policy of Yugoslavia along the right path."7 In 1945 Kardelj, 
then Tito's heir-presumptive, asked the Soviet ambassador not to re-
gard him as a "representative of another country, capable of solving 
questions independently" but as the representative of one of the fu-
ture Soviet republics.8 Such attitudes of leading Titoists attest that the 
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principal task of instilling and fostering love for the USSR had been 
accomplished. Thus a fanatical loyalty to the 'land of socialism' and 
faith in the Soviet Union and its leadership was developed. The grav-
itational pull on this supra-national allegiance apparently was irre-
sistible.9 All matters were judged by a Soviet yardstick and both party 
members and leaders were unable to emerge from the emotional orbit 
in which the CPY rotated. The palpable consequences of this belief 
were such that eventually even very prominent members of the Cen-
tral Committee came to the conclusion that Yugoslav Communists 
had been 'automatons' conditioned to become 'blind tools' of the USSR.10 
Love for the USSR was always the main test of leadership with 
the CPY. The most ardent, fullest love was institutionally linked to 
the leader of the party. In the struggle for party power, all contestants 
vied with each other to prove that theirs was the greatest love of the 
USSR. In 1948, when openly criticized by the leader of the more 
obsequious pro-Soviet fraction of the CPY, Tito repudiated his rival's 
arguments by labelling them intolerable encroachments upon the Sec-
retary General's monopoly of matchless love for the USSR: "You have 
usurped the right to love the Soviet Union more than I do."" 
The CPY's vital pre-revolutionary task was also to make the USSR 
popular in Yugoslavia. Thus, pro-Soviet agitation and propaganda 
was the 'bulk' of party activity, commanding most of the CPY funds. 
The Party also resolutely counteracted the activity of all elements 
customarily accused by the Communists of slandering the Soviet Union. 
It was largely this campaign of deception and fraud that earned the 
Yugoslav Stalinist the disrepute of both mercenaries and ideologically 
motivated fifth columnists.12 
From 1919 onward the CPY had the 'internationalist' duty of 
defending and rendering every possible assistance to the USSR. The 
international fortress and the 'homeland' of all proletarians was to be 
defended from capitalist attacks by all means at the disposal of the 
CPY. Thus Yugoslav Partisans began to resist, more than two months 
after the Axis invasion and occupation of Yugoslavia, only upon the 
receipt of Comintern directives requesting the organization of a move-
ment for the protection of the USSR.13 
This sampling of the Stalinist outlook of Yugoslav Communists 
would remain totally unrepresentative unless at least one example of 
the CPY's adoration of Josif Vissarionovich Stalin is cited. Excerpts 
from an article faithfully convey the official image of the supra-na-
tional party deity: 
Without Stalin the sun would not shine so brightly . . . Stalin is 
the bitterest opponent of everything inhuman . . . Stalin is the 
most wise and the most careful cultivator of everything that is 
most noble and refined in man. Man is for him the most precious 
of treasures . . . 
Stalin is the only statesman that has a clear conscience and an 
unselfish hear t . . . 
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Stalin knows and sees everything, nothing human is unknown 
to him . . . 
He is the greatest strategist of all times . . . Through their love 
for Stalin, the little and the humble become great, eternal, part 
of immortal Stalin . . . Our love for the Soviet Union is inextin-
guishable, as it has become through blood and fire, our life, our 
soul, our future, our survival, our daily bread! This love of ours 
is immortal as it is inspired by the spirit of the great Stalin . . . 
Is there any greater honour and happiness than the feeling that 
your closest and dearest comrade is Stalin? . . . 
Stalin is the most beloved face in our villages and cities . . . With 
his name on their lips our heroes are dying . . . In Stalin lives 
everything that is great, noble and freedom loving in man-
kind . . . Stalin is the incarnated Marxism-Leninism . . . Stalin 
can see future events in centuries to come . . . there are no puz-
zles for Stalin in this world . . .Stalin represents a whole epoch, 
the most decisive one in the whole history . . . Stalin is Lenin of 
today. It is our pride to live in Stalin's era, to fight under his 
leadership and thus become part of an entity that is immortal. 
The future human, no matter at what he may look, will see Lenin 
and Stalin in everything in this world . . .14 
From 1937 to 1945 the CPY had instilled in its Stalinist cadres 
an indomitable lust for power, a ruthless clarity of revolutionary pur-
pose and an extremist quasi-terrorist determination to implement it. 
This process advanced concurrently with self-identification and in-
fatuation with the USSR and Stalin. Yugoslav Communist esprit de 
corps of the period was so extraordinary that party enemies called it 
"fanatical." This fanaticism of the party militants was widely recog-
nized. Aware of their reputation and their faith in the USSR and 
himself, Stalin referred to them as "honest fools."15 
The Communist party of Yugoslavia was not inspired by a native 
revolutionary doctrine, nor motivated solely by a national political 
program. Instead, its ideological foundations were provided by the 
supra-national Marxist-Leninist theory as interpreted by the Com-
intern and Stalin."' Stalin exercised this ideological authority in a way 
reminiscent of pontificial ex cathedra pronouncements 'Rome has spo-
ken, the case is settled.' 
The Crisis 
Under the circumstances, no imagination and little empathy were 
required to anticipate and fathom the mood and reaction of the Yu-
goslav Stalinists once they had been informed of the Cominform's 
position and the masterly indictment of the CPY leadership. It took 
months before the stunning news filtered from the apex of the party 
pyramid downwards through all the intermediate levels of the struc-
ture and hit the cells at the base. A gamut of emotions was witnessed. 
After scanning Stalin's severely critical opening lines, Tito felt as if a 
thunderbolt had struck him.17 So did thousands of his followers. Hav-
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ing lived for so many years in a "special psychological state—more 
than mere faith, closely approaching exaltation," this unexpected 
breakdown in Soviet-Yugoslav Communist relations created an un-
precedented situation. "Thus far [1969] no pen had yet described the 
inner turmoil and strain," the shock, astonishment, terror, dismay, 
panic, bewilderment, bitterness, anxiety and uncertainty that gripped 
the minds of the Communist militants. What they experienced in those 
days resembled the 'elements of Greek tragedies.'18 
The resolution of the Information Bureau concerning the situ-
ation in the Communist party of Yugoslavia declared urbi et orbi that 
the Central Committee of the CPY "has placed itself and the Yugoslav 
party outside the family of the fraternal Communist parties, outside 
the united Communist front and consequently outside the ranks of 
the Information Bureau."19 The IB, furthermore, revealed its con-
viction that inside the CPY there were "sufficient healthy elements" 
still loyal to Marxism-Leninism. These "healthy elements" were pub-
licly assigned the task "to compel their present leaders to recognize 
their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them."2" Should the 
leaders prove themselves incapable of doing this, 'the job' of the healthy 
elements was "to replace them and to advance a new internationalist 
leadership of the party."21 
To this challenge Tito and his closest associates responded res-
olutely as it was easy to choose when no other choice was left to them. 
Tito, a compulsive party power-seeker showed almost instantly that 
he was also a compulsive party power-holder. He and his closest en-
tourage knew that they had gone beyond the point of no return and 
acted as dead men on furlough who had nothing to lose and a whole 
world to gain. For the leading Titoists the year 1948 meant, "to be, 
or not to be." The issue for them was "us or them," a faithful replica 
of Lenin's "who whom."22 Well imbued with Stalin's dictum that "cadres 
decide everything," the top priority Titoist secret response was to 
undertake everything necessary, at any cost, to neutralize and prevent 
any initiative of the "healthy elements."23 
The Response 
Openly and publicly, the leading Titoists were also at the height 
of the desperate situation and performed masterfully under prece-
dented stress. They knew only too well that Yugoslav Communists 
were creatures of the Stalinist world which dictated their thoughts 
and behaviour in accordance with the degree of their 'stalinisation.' 
As all these militants were "infected by the bacillus of dogmatism" or 
even "obsessed by dogma," and as they lived in 'a kind of mental 
climate' where it was 'difficult to pass rational judgments, ' special shock 
absorbers were improvised.24 Accordingly, the defenstration and ex-
communication were at first treated lightly as an incomprehensible 
misunderstanding between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist lead-
ers. In order to secure a semblance of domestic 'legitimacy' of the 
Titoist regime, a party congress, the first in twenty years, was hastily 
summoned. It was 'packed' as selected delegates were all certified 
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Titoist 'yes men.' Adulation of the USSR and adoration of Stalin were 
tolerated in the customary form. Thus monolithic unity was outwardly 
preserved and a reshuffled Titoist leadership 'elected' almost unan-
imously. The twin allegiance to Stalin and Tito were still deliberately 
stressed to be compatible in order to facilitate the planned conversion 
to Titoism. It was not by accident that Tito himself concluded the 
Congress with "Long live Comrade Stalin."25 Asked "about the gradual 
way" in which the party militants and the people were told about the 
causes and issues involved in the dispute, Tito explained: 
It had to be that way. It was not a case of genuflecting before 
authority, but because of our (party) masses. We had to move 
very cautiously, because of Stalin's uncontested authority. If we 
had been too sudden about it, we would have cut ourselves from 
the masses. If we had been too slow, the Soviets would have 
crushed us. We could not afford bitterness. We had to let time 
and Soviet behaviour work for us until the masses would them-
selves say: Down with Stalin! 
As the Soviet Communists always tell the truth whenever it is in 
their interest to do so, they destroyed by a diabolically effective blend 
of facts, sarcasm, cynicism and invective, some of the most cherished 
and sacro-sanct Yugoslav Partisan myths. Thus the anathema and the 
excommunication eventually led to a wholesale emotional 're-evalu-
ation of all values' through agonizing reappraisals of all the points of 
the internationalized indictment. This 'soul-searching' also spelled the 
end of the Stalinist monolithic unity of thought and action within the 
CPY. Many Yugoslav Communists, who were led to believe uncritically 
their own agitprop's fantasies, felt deeply hurt. Humiliated and in-
sulted, they began to reciprocate, often out of genuine indignation 
which steadily grew in proportion to the magnitude of the real or 
imaginary Soviet provocation. 
Convinced that the first shock had been withstood and sensing 
this scattered, spontaneous anti-Stalinist reaction of some militants, 
the official assessment of the Soviet action was radically changed. 
Instead of feigning injured innocence and mere repudiation of 'slan-
ders' or explanations of the conflict in terms of mistaken decisions 
made without Stalin's concurrence, the Titoist leadership placed be-
fore every Yugoslav Communist the unavoidable dilemma of loyalty 
and commitment. The dilemma of with whom to side was later de-
picted as "the conflict between two concepts of duty: one to Moscow, 
capital of the first successful socialist revolution, and the other to one's 
own socialist revolution."27 
The Internal Struggle 
In the meantime, the pro-Soviet elements had rallied and inten-
sified their undermining activities. Yugoslav Stalinists, in their capacity 
as Soviet agents, had infiltrated key positions in the Yugoslav army, 
security forces, party and major ministries. "Atmosphere was tense 
and poisoned by conspiratorial moods," Stalinists were found every-
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where while the "threatening pro-Soviet propaganda addled the brains 
of many."28 Despite the fact that the outspoken and most militant 
Stalinists had been arrested, the Cominformists seemed to be multi-
plying, especially in party committees and among the army officers.29 
At this point, a showdown was staged by the Titoists and all protes-
tations of loyalty to the Soviet Union and vows of fidelity to Stalin 
were once and for all prohibited. Instead, mandatory loyalty tests 
were introduced. 
Tito and his leading acolytes possessed an insatiable 'will to power' 
and an unconquerable wish to survive as leaders of the party and 
rulers of Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, they were painfully aware that their 
authority over the militants was based on Soviet fiat and Stalin's con-
tinued approval. Excommunicated by Stalin, they had no doubt that 
a thorough 'destalinization' of the party cadres was a condition sine qua 
non for their survival. Taught by their Stalinist experience, they also 
knew that to achieve their common purpose they had to keep the 
cadres under strict physical and 'thought' control until sincere or 
forced conversion to 'Titoism' or 'national Communism' became pos-
sible. To engineer this realignment and transfer of allegiance from 
Stalin and the USSR to Tito and Yugoslavia, an elaborate plan was 
effected. 
The first phase of this project required a comprehensive loyalty 
re-examination of the CPY's followers. As ideological X-rays and Or-
wellian 'telescreens' were non-existent, the Titoists used greatly im-
proved and modernized conventional methods. T h e CPY kept 
comprehensive confidential files on its followers and a thorough reas-
sessment and almost daily updating of these records was ordered. 
The key item in each file was the summary, called 'karakteristika,' the 
official secret rating of political reliability and personal conduct. Main-
taining these fidelity charts involved all party members as potential 
suspects, informers and investigators. 
The burden of proof of the fidelity was placed on the individual 
but one's standing depended on consolidated reports, corroborated 
by observations of several independent informers. These informers 
exerted utmost vigilance in their constant supervision of comrades 
under scrutiny. For 'unmasking' Stalinists, knowledge of personal 
background, character, virtues, weaknesses, habits, vices, trespassings, 
and inclinations of each member was required. Thus a host of fervent 
private detectives and secret policemen began to work feverishly for 
the Titoist prosecutors. A veritable pandemonium reigned supreme 
in the CPY. 
Short of direct Soviet military intervention and invasion, all party 
members were totally at the mercy of the Titoist authority. T o gain 
time and avoid prosecution, many militants did all they could to con-
ceal their obdurate Stalinist allegiance. Even those already flirting with 
Titoism had to make sustained efforts to avoid suspicion of being 
Stalinists. Both Stalinists and Titoists in the offing thus did all they 
could to embellish their 'karakteristika' and enhance their safety and 
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career. This non-stop witch-hunt prompted a multitude of pathetic 
declarations of fidelity and loyalty oaths, genuine and hypocritical.30 
Proving one's innocence became a full-time occupation and often a 
probatio diabolica. 
In these probes of loyalty, the Titoists were concerned only with 
power-politics. They wished to know where individual members stood 
in the raging struggle for power. This was, under the circumstances, 
easier said than done. The head of the secret police conceded this, 
with great distress, "The worst thing is that you don't know who your 
enemy is! Yesterday's friend becomes today's enemy—the enemy is 
in one's own house."31 Accordingly, the Titoists sought to identify and 
isolate militants who were inveterate Stalinists. Among these, individ-
uals or factions that had had the temerity to oppose Tito's rise to 
power became primary targets of the secret police. The potentially 
'convertible' Stalinists and the conformist Titoists in the offing were 
welcomed. The most reliable 'declared' Titoists took control of the 
party replacing the proscribed and suspect incumbents. 
However, this intended "process of liberation from Stalin as a 
god did not proceed evenly, equally and simultaneously for all."32 
Different initial motivations, experiences, personalities and characters 
resulted in a wide range of differentiation. 
As Marxism-Leninism had universal appeal and represented all 
things to those who embraced it, the Yugoslav congregation of this 
secular creed included a variety of personality types. The CPY at-
tracted impatient radicals, naive romantics, idealists and others having 
a hostile view of the pre-revolutionary status quo. T o many, the CPY 
offered the inspiration usually furnished by fanatical religious sects. 
Others joined for reasons best understood by psychiatrists. Still others 
were prompted by the hope, or belief, that they were joining the party 
of the future. All of them joined in a search for gratification and 
fulfillment they could not obtain under the established social order. 
Nevertheless, the desire for power, and the passion to exercize au-
thority, appears to have been the basic motivation for affiliation.33 
Battered by relentless ideological sermons and excoriations, this 
Communist body politic was now goaded into predictably different 
but typical responses. The ranks of professional revolutionaries were 
saturated with ideologically indifferent careerists and opportunists. 
Few among them expected Tito to survive the fall from Stalin's grace 
and acted accordingly, but surreptitiously. Militants sincerely ani-
mated by Marxism-Leninism differed in their reactions. The most 
exuberant, young and pure in heart who followed their beliefs, be-
cause they did not have time to learn better, often failed to conceal 
their true sentiments and refused to abjure Stalin. Others sided firmly 
with Stalin, paid lip service to Tito and remained in the party as 
political and ideological saboteurs. Some, already dissatisfied for a 
variety of reasons even before the anathema, were now willing to side 
with Stalin.34 Many were paralyzed in the abulic pose of Buridan's 
Ass.35 
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Numerous 'realists' recognized the uncertainty of their situation 
and believed that opting for Stalin, the likely victor, would be politic 
but temporized hoping to toe the Titoist party line until the situation 
had crystalized. These members eventually were to join the band 
wagon in the viva chi vince fashion. Ultimately, they formed the ma-
jority in the Titoist faction. Thousands of ideologically indifferent 
and phlegmatic peasants who were sucked into the party as revolu-
tionary flotsam and jetsam remained obedient to anyone in authority. 
Nevertheless, many sincere Stalinists, disenchanted with the post-rev-
olutionary socialist reality in Yugoslavia hoped to find, in Titoism, 
what they could not find in Stalinism. They wished for a reborn, 
fortified and purified party and hoped for an ideological and ethical 
revival through Titoism. Others, in personal political predicaments, 
docilely bowed before the Titoist absolute power. Still others managed 
to change sides repeatedly. Some began to doubt both the Stalinist 
and the Titoist causes. At the same time, "many honest fools . . . were 
coming to their senses" by becoming enthusiastic Titoists.86 
Stalinists Strike Back 
In the meantime the 'healthy elements' began rallying. "Stalin 
was still counting on his fifth column in Yugoslavia and on the Yu-
goslav Communist 'honest fools' mentality."37 If the year 1948 was 
bad, 1949 seemed infinitely worse. Everything in the country seemed 
to be at boiling point. "The longer the battle with Stalin lasted and 
more excited and emotional both sides became. This pure 'emotion-
alism' recalled the atmosphere of religious conflicts from the Refor-
mation period."38 "A terrible nightmare oppressed all of us (Titoists): 
was it possible to fight Stalinism, not with Stalinist, but with other 
means?"39 Apparently it was not. Despite his earlier assertion that the 
Yugoslav revolution was not devouring its children, Tito embarked 
on the most ruthless wholesale 'destalinization' of the same cadres that 
he himself had stalinized. The conversions to Titoism were carried 
out from above, by a variety of manipulative Stalinist methods in-
cluding 'administrative' persuasion, intimidation, expulsions, purges, 
incarceration, concentration camps and torture. As a result, it will 
never be reliably established to what extent the conversions to Titoism 
represented a genuine change of sentiment. Was it for the majority 
of converts a conformist expediency to avoid the fate of the Stalinists? 
Therefore, many of the seemingly orthodox Titoists must, in fact, be 
the Communist replicas of the Moriscos and Marranos coerced by the 
Spanish inquisition. 
The Tactics of De-Stalinization 
A notoriously unscrupulous and ruthless Stalinist professional 
revolutionary, Tito, was compelled to become an anti-Stalinist cru-
sader. Faced with disunity and growing disloyalty in the party, Tito 
felt that his anti-Stalinist cause could be salvaged solely in a Stalinist 
fashion. As the mass support he needed was not forthcoming, he 
decided to cut through his Gordian knot by reducing the strength of 
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the Stalinist opposition in the party and by increasing the number of 
his followers. A veteran archpurger, Tito embarked upon a cleansing 
and 'packing' operation of unmatched magnitude. According to Com-
informist data, between 1948 and 1952, Tito expelled from the party 
some 200,000 Communists of whom 30,000 were imprisoned with 
lengthy prison sentences and several thousand were killed. Among 
the imprisoned there were 5,000 officers cumulatively sentenced to 
more than 50,000 years imprisonment.40 
The expellees represented 50% of the total strength of the CPY 
and 75% of the leading cadres.41 Thus, the Cominformists allege, the 
true Marxist-Leninist CPY was liquidated. From its remnants the so-
called Communist League of Yugoslavia was formed. Its principal aim 
was to secure personal power for Tito and his clique by means of 
ruthless counter-revolutionary terror and suppression of Yugoslav 
Communists with an internationalist outlook. As in Yugoslavia "the 
expulsion from the party was the equivalent of the death penalty in 
a military organization,"42 little need be said about the lasting impact 
that this ideological reorientation of Tito's leadership had on the life 
of so many tens of thousand of Communist militants. 
To keep in check the Stalinists that had, or might have, remained 
in the party despite the purge, Tito opened wide its gates to replenish 
the vacuum created by the expulsions. According to Cominformists, 
this replacement contingent consisted of motley bourgeois, kulak, de-
classe bureaucratic and lumpenproletarian elements. Many of these 
had incontrovertible records of reactionary, anti-Communist and 
counter-revolutionary activity. These 'unprincipled careerists'joined 
the privileged Communist 'new class' with alacrity and immediately 
began self-seekingly to work on the improvement of their collective 
and individual lots. Abjectly docile, these instant Titoists, in gratitude 
for their miraculously improved new status, were only too willing to 
sing Tito's praises. Supported by this packed and rigged congregation, 
Tito remained, in power for life, outside all control and effective 
criticism by the party 'masses.'43 By purging the bulk of the CPY's 
'heroic' revolutionary generation, Tito radically altered the socio-eco-
nomic, socio-political and ideological profile of the party. The effect 
of this transformation was felt for decades by all Yugoslav Commu-
nists. 
The Victims 
However, by far the most traumatic effect that the crisis inflicted 
on the party followers was caused by the absolutely unprecedented 
victimization reserved for the arrested and imprisoned Communist 
opposition. The issue is now eponymically associated with the location 
in which most of the worst excesses occurred: the concentration camps 
on the Naked Island. A miniature replica of Stalin's Siberian camps, 
Tito's Gulag was euphemistically known as a correction centre for 
'socially beneficial work.'44 It was established at the end of 1948 when 
Tito decided to "house" Cominformists on an island precluding es-
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capes. The camp was run by secret policemen trained in the USSR 
immediately after the war. The worst Stalinist sinners were shipped 
off first, in great haste and without any technical and engineering 
preparations, to build the camp themselves and to welcome its steadily 
growing population.45 
Evil and shame—evil beyond compare, unending shame—is what 
lay in store for the prisoners in the camp. Never mind the foul 
food, the mindless and exhausting labour in the quarry, the 
prisoners were subjected to torture, the cruelty of which was 
matched by its perversity. The security officers were given the 
task of reeducating the prisoners . . . The secret police recruited 
teams from the ranks of the penitent and organized them into 
'self-managing units'—that is exactly what they were called. These 
units then took over the task of reeducation, through violence.46 
The quality of the Yugoslav Communist violence and the stand-
ards of Titoist terror have always commanded the kind of negative 
respect usually reserved for the perpetrators of 'perfect crimes.' The 
concentration camps were hors catégorie, sui generis establishments. Their 
administrative apparatus of coercion and record of bestiality defy 
normal imagination. Even the head of the UDBA rated the methods 
of the Titoist secret police worse than Stalin's. Other prominent Ti-
toists also paid similar compliments: as to the treatment of heretics 
"one might contend that Stalin was less cruel. He just shot them. Our 
system slowly deprives them of life. It is like Orwell's 1984, but worse."47 
Accordingly, corrective methods devised and applied by the Titoist 
UDBA were "possibly the most diabolical in history."48 The impact of 
the compulsory ideological reeducation and enforced conversions was 
unmistakable: "very few, if any, returned from the Naked Island 
unscathed. Not so much physically, perhaps, as psychologically and 
intellectually. Many were bitter, depressed, shattered. Even wise and 
well-intended ideological reeducation—let alone the forced methods 
of Goli Otok—leads inevitably to aberration and tragedy . . ."49 
Monitoring the impact that the crisis of established Stalinism had 
on the Yugoslav militants, one would expect the issues at stake in the 
accompanying ideological disputation to overpower the observer with 
an irresistible force. However, both paradoxically and understanda-
bly, this was not the case in the conversion to Titoism. The low ide-
ological standards of the 'heroic' generation of Yugoslav Communists 
were often likened to the Achilles' heel of the CPY. This deficiency 
was directly traceable to the appointment of Tito as the leader of the 
party as his appointment was the consumation of a crass anti-intel-
lectual course inaugurated by the Comintern. Both Tito and his closest 
associates were incapable of intellectual domination of the CPY's in-
telligentsia. The new atmosphere he created within the party was more 
than simply anti-intellectual: it was termed 'barbarian'!"'" Antagonized 
by Tito from the outset, the party intelligentsia felt his leadership 
would cause a 'return to the pre-literate age in CPY history.' From 
the ensuing clash of illiterati versus illuminati Tito emerged victorious 
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only after he had purged, expelled or liquidated most of the Com-
munist intelligentsia. 
As a result, the Yugoslav cadres never developed their ideological 
muscles and only a smattering of Marxist-Leninist theory was ham-
mered into the heads of the militants by oversimplification and rep-
etition. The overwhelming majority lacked even an elementary grasp 
of the popularly exposed theoretical concepts. In this matter the CPY 
appears to have closely resembled the two million Bolsheviks, who 
were said in 1923 to babble in the Marxist phraseology with the un-
derstanding of parrots emulating human speech. The ideological im-
pact of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute was restricted to the small high 
priesthood of the party. The laity was concerned solely with pedestrian 
issues of practical politics. Ordinary militants were not interested in, 
nor capable of 'Homoousian' hairsplitting.51 
Titoism gave a new lease on ideological life to many of its Com-
munist supporters. A fanatically militant minority of these still hoped 
to change the world and create heaven on earth, at least in Yugoslavia. 
But even the genuine Titoist enthusiasts and ideological cheer-lead-
erettes became disillusioned as they became aware of the growing 
discrepancy between their ideological dreams and the Yugoslav Titoist 
reality. 
Having lost their hope-sustaining illusions, they managed to lib-
erate themselves from their ideological fixed ideas: 
The Revolution has lost its glitter. It promised too much. It gave 
the peasants the impression that every little village would have 
its university and the cows would have gold teeth. Now there is 
no more enthusiasm. And Tito, poor Tito, he leads the life of 
old John D. Rockefeller, friendless, lonely surrounded by toad-
ies . . . 
Poor Yugoslavia, it has suffered so much. Now after the Revo-
lution that engulfed us all, it is resuming its traditional role— 
just another little Balkan police state that nobody really cares 
about.52 
Too many militants have gone through raptures, doubts and 
disenchantments of both Stalinism and Titoism. In the process, some 
have been totally transformed as the ideology has no more effect on 
their personal and political conduct. Many grew less fanatical, others 
are ideologically 'lobotomized'. This process of gradual sobering and 
maturing continues hand-in-hand with the withering away of the ide-
ological myth. 
Marxism-Leninism, in its Titoist version, might still be the opium 
of a diminishing number of Yugoslav Communists. However, the 
lasting impact that the conversion had on the Yugoslav Communist 
militants might have been best described by the words of the Com-
munist Manifesto itself, written a century before the outbreak of the 
ideological crisis. "Ultimately, when stubborn historical facts had dis-
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persed all the intoxicating effects of self-deception, this form of So-
cialism ended in a miserable fit of the blues." 
The transformation of the established Yugoslav Stalinist ideology 
into a Titoist official creed has affected an entire generation of Yu-
goslav Communists. The crisis left indelible mental scars on both the 
victors and the vanquished. As often in past religious wars, the conflict 
ended, or an armistice was reached, in the cujus regio, ejus religio fash-
ion. 
International Implications 
The crisis caused by the dispute between the Cominform and the 
Titoists has subsided. But the crisis of the established Marxist-Leninist 
ideology in Yugoslavia continues as always and remains a permanent 
crisis. A quarrel between correligionists who still officially profess to 
share a common world outlook has not extirpated the coexisting Ti-
toist and Stalinist loyalties. It has only brought about an end to the 
Communist unity of will and action thus weakening the New Class 
and its minority rule.53 But the most important factor in this per-
manent crisis is the protracted inability of Yugoslav Communists, both 
Stalinists and Titoists to persuade the enormous majority of their 
compatriots to share their Marxist-Leninist cosmic views and freely 
endorse Titoist policies. This fundamental ideological and political 
split would be a formidable challenge to any democratic government, 
let alone a minority one that was democratic only in name. 
The conversion was the first major Marxist-Leninist ideological 
crisis caused by a dispute between two states sharing the same official 
ideology. As such, it spelled the end of the ideologically prophesized 
hopes of international relations of a 'new type.' In the process of 
conversion, Titoist Communist inhumanity of man to man, destroyed 
all hopes of a reconstruction of human nature in accordance with the 
Marxist-Leninist ideological ideal. By making virtue out of necessity, 
the Titoists managed to extricate themselves from the voluntary ser-
vitude to the USSR, a subservience into which they themselves had 
forced Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia became the first state to be expelled 
from the Soviet bloc and become 'non-aligned.' The Titoists were the 
first Marxist-Leninists to establish and institutionalize their right to 
an independent interpretation of the ideological scriptures. A mile-
stone in the history of the Communist movement, the conversion was 
the first crack in the wall of faith and still threatens the future of 
Yugoslavia and the Titoists. 
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